quarta-feira, 3 de junho de 2026

Europe’s Humiliating Exodus: How Rigged Excellence Betrays Its Peripheral Talent


In the previous post, linked above, I argued that Europe’s technological humiliation is not the result of insufficient talent, but of its refusal to give talent the power to matter. The continent trains exceptional researchers, deprives them of the compute, capital and scale needed to compete, and then acts surprised when the United States absorbs them. But emigration is only the end of the betrayal. Long before Europe loses researchers across the Atlantic, it abandons many at home — by reserving the laboratories, networks, investment and institutional advantages that make innovation possible for regions rich enough to possess them.

A paper just published in Higher Education makes the pattern unusually clear. Examining direct university patenting across 2,886 institutions in 31 European countries and 295 regions between 2011 and 2019, it lands on precisely the kind of finding European policymakers adore: universities drawing a larger share of their revenue from competitive, third-party funding file more patents, and patents with greater citation impact, than those relying mainly on core public allocations. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10734-026-01687-1?

More competition, more entrepreneurship, more innovation: the familiar Brussels catechism. But the sermon collapses the moment one asks where this supposedly meritocratic machinery actually works. The relationship between third-party funding and university patenting is strongest in Europe’s richest regions, weaker in middle-income ones, and negligible in the poorest. In other words, the funding system does not level the field; it pours further advantage into the regions already equipped with laboratories, industrial partners, investors, networks and prestige. 

Europe calls it excellence. In practice, it is accumulated advantage receiving another instalment. The numbers expose the underlying obscenity. The concentration is not merely uncomfortable; it is grotesque. Universities in just five countries — Germany, the UK, France, Belgium and Switzerland — account for more than 70% of all direct patent application, while 73% of the universities examined filed no direct patents at all.

This is the missing half of Europe's talent story. The continent concentrates opportunity in a narrow core, leaves everyone else to compete in a game whose decisive assets were handed out long before the whistle, and then acts surprised when its most ambitious researchers — having found that even Europe's privileged core cannot match the scale on offer in California — leave the continent altogether. Talent flows uphill at every level: from the periphery to the core, and from the core to America.

The mechanism is brutally simple. Poorer regions are told to compete harder in a system whose laboratories, industrial partners, venture capital, reputations and grant-winning machinery are already concentrated among the winners. When the periphery predictably struggles, it is lectured about ambition and entrepreneurial culture. And the winners applaud. Europe has built one of its most elegant, deeply cynical and politically useful machines: a device for laundering inherited advantage through the vocabulary of merit. Historical concentration becomes competitive success. Institutional wealth becomes performance. Regional privilege becomes innovation policy. And geography, at last, is renamed excellence.

PS - My own country offers a revolting illustration of how Europe betrays its peripheral talent. Portugal uses scarce public money to train scientists such as Cristiana Pires, Fábio Rosa and Filipe Pereira — only for a system rigged in favour of Europe’s rich core where they can build an innovative cancer-biotech company worth tens of millions of euros. The poor periphery pays for the brains; the wealthy core captures the company, the investment, the qualified jobs and the wealth. Europe calls it scientific mobility. The honest name is organised extraction: rich countries becoming richer by absorbing the future of poorer ones. https://19-pacheco-torgal-19.blogspot.com/2026/04/uma-brilhante-estrategia-portuguesa.html

segunda-feira, 1 de junho de 2026

Improváveis competências femininas num mundo cada vez mais dominado pela IA

 

Na sequência do post anterior, dedicado à agressividade feminina, talvez seja agora de elementar justiça celebrar uma jovem mulher cuja força não se mede pela capacidade de agredir, como acontece com muitas outras, mas por uma invulgar capacidade de reconstruir.

Lin Guoer é uma jovem chinesa que pega num gerador diesel coberto de ferrugem e óleo, muitas vezes mais velho do que ela própria, desmonta-o até ao último parafuso, limpa-lhe as entranhas, rebobina-lhe o motor, remove-lhe a corrosão e devolve-o ao mundo a trabalhar como se a sucata tivesse acabado de receber uma segunda vida. https://www.youtube.com/@linguoermechanic

Depois de diplomada em Engenharia Hidráulica e Hidroeléctrica, Lin Guoer regressou à sua terra natal, onde se dedica a transformar máquinas abandonadas na matéria-prima de uma carreira improvável: a de influenciadora da mecânica. Motores diesel, bombas de água, geradores, motosserras, etc etc etc tudo aquilo que lhe chega às mãos enferrujado ou dado como morto reaparece nos seus vídeos desmontado, recuperado e novamente operacional.

A imprensa chinesa chama-lhe “Mulan da mecânica”, e a designação não é despropositada: perante redes sociais cada vez mais transformadas num monumento à vacuidade e à superficialidade, onde a maquilhagem, o consumo exibicionista e a exposição narcísica valem como substitutos de qualquer competência, Lin Guoer oferece algo radicalmente mais raro — competência técnica indiscutível. Cada vídeo revela paciência, destreza manual e a capacidade de devolver uma nova "vida" ao que outros rapidamente condenariam à sucata.

PS - A história de Lin Guoer tem ainda uma outra leitura. Num post de 27 de Maio de 2025 escrevi: "hoje mesmo o catedrático jubilado Robert Reich, ter defendido no seu blogue, que muitos dos empregos do futuro não necessitarão de uma formação de ensino superior". A isso soma-se ainda o facto do último número da revista The Economist revelar que a geração Z demonstra um interesse crescente por profissões técnicas e muito menos por formações académicas. https://www.economist.com/international/2025/12/18/ditch-textbooks-and-learn-how-to-use-a-wrench-to-ai-proof-your-job Durante décadas, o Ocidente desprezou quem sabia construir, soldar, reparar e dar uma nova vida a coisas velhas. A ironia cruel é que, num mundo cada vez mais saturado de diplomas, muitos deles que nem sequer valem um caracol, e crescentemente ameaçado pela inteligência artificial, recuperar um motor "morto" pode afinal valer muito mais do que muitas profissões consideradas superiores.

domingo, 31 de maio de 2026

The Humiliating Lie Behind Europe’s Technological Decline: That It Lacks Talent

Every few months, Brussel produces another report explaining why Europe is falling behind in artificial intelligence, and every few months it reaches for the same comforting vocabulary: not enough talent, not enough graduates, not enough "ecosystem.". It is an elegant alibi because it avoids the humiliating truth. As a recent Bruegel analysis makes clear, Europe’s problem is not a shortage of brains or ideas. It is a shortage of compute and capital — the two things the continent has been unwilling to finance at the scale required.

Consider Mistral, the company Europe presents as proof that it still belongs in the AI race. Its flagship models were trained on Microsoft Azure. It opened an office in Palo Alto to attract Silicon Valley engineers and venture capital. Its attempt to build European sovereign compute has secured roughly €830 million for infrastructure and GPUs, barely a down payment in an industry now being shaped investment measured in hundreds, of billions. Europe’s AI champion still depends on American cloud power and still has to go to California to find the scale.  https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/europe-needs-strategy-close-artificial-intelligence-compute-gap

The broader record is more brutal. Mario Draghi’s 2024 competitiveness report noted that no EU company founded from scratch in the previous fifty years had reached a market capitalisation above €100 billion. Half a century without producing a new corporate giant of that scale. And the failure is no longer confined to start-ups or frontier models. In a previous post, I examined the disturbing weakness of Germany in AI publication intensity: Europe’s industrial powerhouse, the country wrapped in the mythology of engineering supremacy, was already being outperformed by Portugal and several much smaller economies. The industrial verdict is now even more humiliating. In 2025, the United States produced roughly forty large foundation models, China about fifteen, and the entire European Union around three. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/what-drives-the-divide-in-transatlantic-ai-strategy/

Then comes the figure that should bury the talent fairy tale: around 12% of EU artificial-intelligence PhDs relocate to the United States within five years. Europe trains the researchers, congratulates itself on the excellence of its universities, denies them the compute, capital and industrial scale needed to compete — and then watches them leave for the very ecosystem Europe claims it wants to rival. This is not simply a continent losing an AI race. It is a continent refusing to enter it on serious terms. Europe did not run out of talent. It starved talent of scale and exported it to its competitors. 

PS — In August 2024, I noted that the companies producing the most highly cited AI research and patents were concentrated in the United States and China, with Europe already humiliatingly absent. What then looked like a warning now reads as a continental autopsy report. https://19-pacheco-torgal-19.blogspot.com/2024/08/the-list-of-companies-that-are.html